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• The Human Rights Act 1998 works well and we suggest that any attempt to 
amend it should be viewed with caution. 
 
 
In answer to the question in Theme 2 of the Terms of Reference of whether any 
change be made to the framework established by sections 3 and 4 of the HRA: 
 
• We do not recommend the amendment or repeal of section 3 which strikes 
the right balance between parliamentary sovereignty and incorporating the 
Convention rights into UK law. 
 
• Moreover, Parliament may intervene to correct legislation which has been 
interpreted in a way with which it disagrees. 
 
• The intention of Parliament is a contested concept and, as such, should not 
be used as a standard against which interpretations under section 3 are 
evaluated or (if section 3 were amended) governed. 
 
• The terms of reference ask whether declarations of incompatibility should be 
‘considered as part of the initial process of interpretation … so as to enhance 
the role of Parliament in determining how any incompatibility should be 
addressed’. If this is suggesting involving Parliament in determining the 
meaning of legislation in a live case then we argue that this would be highly 
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problematic in terms of separation of powers, the right to a fair trial under 
Article 6 and the sub judice rule. There would also be practical problems in 
deciding what Parliament’s involvement would be. 
 
• We suggest that, where a declaration of incompatibility has been made, the 
relevant Minister should be obliged to make a statement to the House of 
Commons as to whether or not the Government intends to amend the 






Theme 2: The impact of the HRA on the relationship between the judiciary, the 
executive and the legislature 
 
a) Should any change be made to the framework established by sections 3 and 
4 of the HRA? In particular: 
• Are there instances where, as a consequence of domestic courts and 
tribunals seeking to read and give effect to legislation compatibly with the 
Convention rights (as required by section 3), legislation has been interpreted 
in a manner inconsistent with the intention of the UK Parliament in enacting it? 
If yes, should section 3 be amended (or repealed)? 
 
1. We do not recommend amendment or repeal of section 3. The provision 
strikes the right balance between making the Convention rights an integral 
part of UK law, including statute, and respecting the words used in legislation. 
 
2. Moreover, if Parliament believes that the courts have gone too far in 
interpreting legislation so as to conform with the Convention rights, then it 
may correct this. Parliament may enact legislation making it explicitly clear 
that it should be interpreted and applied in a particular way even if it conflicts 
with the Convention rights. 
 
3. Further, the intention of Parliament is a notoriously slippery concept and it is a 
mistake to believe that it may be identified in a conclusive way.  
i. Even if we imagine that Parliament has one intention with regard to a 
particular statutory provision, any attempt to identify this by the courts (or 
anyone else) would not identify that original intention; rather it would be a 
mere reconstruction, a best guess (influenced by conscious and 
unconscious biases) at what the original was. 
ii. This view that any identified intention will be a reconstruction rather than 
the original is even more the case where the legislation in question is 
being applied to a factual situation not discussed, and perhaps not even 
envisaged, by Parliament. 
iii. Also, it is self-evident that among the about 800 peers that compose the 
House of Lords and 650 MPs that make up the Commons, there is not one 
common intention. Parliamentarians will vote for or against legislation for 
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various reasons. So, the question would be ‘whose intention do we 
attempt to identify’. Would it be, for instance, only those who spoke in 
debate and voted in favour of a Bill? Only those who voted at Third 
Reading in each House? Only the promoters of the Bill? There is, we 
suggest, no way to answer this question which would not involve 
prioritising the views of a subsection of Parliament over Parliament as a 
whole. 
 
4. This difficulty in identifying the intention of Parliament would be very evident if 
section 3 were replaced with a provision which limited – by reference to such 
intention – the obligation to interpret legislation in conformity with the 
Convention rights. In cases where the obligation to so interpret arose, there 
would be extensive argument about what Parliament intended when it 
enacted the legislation with the parties drawing on various extraneous 
material such as Hansard, Ministerial statements, press releases, party 
manifestos, etc. 
 
• Should declarations of incompatibility (under section 4) be considered as 
part of the initial process of interpretation rather than as a matter of last resort, 
so as to enhance the role of Parliament in determining how any incompatibility 
should be addressed? 
 
5. We assume the suggestion here is that, if a court determines at an early stage 
that there is likely to be a declaration of incompatibility that it should pause the 
case and make some kind of referral to Parliament. If this assumption is 
incorrect, we cannot see the benefit of a declaration being ‘considered as part 
of the initial process of interpretation … so as to enhance the role of 
Parliament in determining how any incompatibility should be addressed.’ 
 
6. If our assumption is correct, then such involvement of Parliament in a live 
case would be highly problematic for many reasons. First, it would be a clear 
breach of the separation of powers principle which requires that Parliament 
legislates and that the courts, not Parliament, determine the meaning of 
legislation in the context of the case before them. 
 
7. Second, it would involve a political body – Parliament – becoming involved in 
the judicial process. This may itself breach the right to a fair trial under article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
8. Third, such involvement by Parliament would breach the sub judice rule which 
prevents parliamentarians commenting on a case currently before the courts. 
 
9. There would also be significant practical questions which would need to be 
addressed if this approach were taken. For example, would any referral to 
Parliament be to both Houses. If so, this would likely cause delays to the 
decision of the case in question. Or, would a referral be to, say, a joint 
committee. If the latter, would any determination of this committee need to be 
approved by Parliament by positive or negative resolution? 
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e) Should the remedial order process, as set out in section 10 of and Schedule 
2 to the HRA, be modified, for example by enhancing the role of Parliament? 
 
10. We suggest that the remedial process established in section 10 and Schedule 
2 be retained. It provides a speedy process to amend legislation in order to 
bring it into line with the Convention rights while the positive resolution 
procedure set out in Schedule 2 ensures the appropriate involvement of both 
Houses of Parliament. 
 
11. However, we suggest one change which would enhance the role of 
Parliament: if there is a declaration of incompatibility, and the case will 
proceed no further (ie there will not be an appeal or the declaration has been 
issued or confirmed by the Supreme Court), the relevant Minister should be 
obliged to make a statement to the House of Commons as to whether or not 




12. The Human Rights Act 1998 seems to us to strike the right balance between 
incorporating the Convention rights and respecting parliamentary sovereignty. 
Moreover, the Act means that Convention cases are, more often than not, 
decided by UK courts. This, along with the mechanisms in sections 3 and 4, 
means that the UK Government is less likely to be found in breach of the 
Convention by the European Court of Human Rights. For this reason, we 
suggest that any proposed amendment to the 1998 Act should be viewed with 
caution. 
 
13. Additionally, the review seems to be motivated by an executive dislike of 
constraints on executive power, such dislike being fed and substantiated by 
sometimes wildly inaccurate press reporting. For the sake of clarity, we 
suggest that we (as a country) should be very wary of amending the Human 
Rights Act 1998 in favour of a system of protecting rights against abuse of 
executive power with which the executive is perfectly comfortable. 
